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1. Introduction
It is well recognized that stock returns are to some extent predictable over time, as documented
by means of time-series regressions of stock returns on a set of forecasting variables. What remains
a puzzle is whether this predictability is an anomaly that could lead markets astray, a rational
feature of nancial markets that reects time-varying preferences and expectations, or an anomaly
that cannot be exploited by investors because of trading restrictions. Sorting portfolios on size, mo-
mentum, transaction costs, market-to-book, investment-to-assets and return-on-assets ratios, and
using industry classications, we indeed nd considerable levels and variation of return predictabil-
ity, inconsistent with asset pricing models. We, then, provide a way to directly assess whether such
return predictability is consistent with rational asset pricing when investors face market frictions
such as short sales constraints and transaction costs. In particular, we focus on the impact of mar-
ket frictions on the asset pricing modelsability to capture time-variation in return predictability,
and analyze whether cross-sectional di¤erences in return predictability are consistent with what
might be expected when predictability is rational.
Rational asset pricing models imply that the joint process of returns and a stochastic discount
factor is not predictable in frictionless market. Assuming that investors can trade freely without any
costs or constraints, Kirby (1998) shows how to use this relation to infer the values of the coe¢ cients
in a predictive regression of asset returns on a set of instruments. His approach indicates that the
ability to predict returns must be equal to a risk premium for undertaking systematic risk while
following a trading strategy intended to exploit predictability.
We extend this approach by analyzing next to the consistency of the rational asset pricing
models with the observed predictability, the cross-sectional di¤erences in return predictability, and
taking into account market frictions. We nd that the prots from a trading strategy intended to
exploit predictability need no longer be equal to a risk premium as implied by rational asset pricing
models. The inability to go short or the presence of transaction costs may force investors to deviate
from a trading rule that exploits predictability, thus lowering their prots.1
Although, especially since the removal of the uptick rule in 2007, investors can easily take short
positions in U.S. stock markets, many institutional investors are precluded by their charters from
doing so.2 At a minimum, our analysis of short sales constraints on predictability in asset returns
1For unconditional returns, He and Modest (1995) nd that the combination of short sale constraints, borrowing
constraints and trading costs can reconcile the Consumption-CAPM with U.S. stock market returns. Luttmer (1996),
on the other hand, nds low levels of transaction costs (on the order of 50 basis points) to signicantly weaken
restrictions on the variability of the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, and nds in his tests little evidence
against power utility specications with low risk-aversion parameters.
2Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004) report that only about 30% of mutual funds are allowed by their
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is relevant to the latter. Transaction costs are known to be important to asset pricing and portfolio
holdings, as shown in many papers including He and Modest (1995), Luttmer (1996), Lynch and
Balduzzi (2000) and Liu (2004). There is also evidence of substantial cross-sectional and times
series variation in transaction costs observed in the markets, transaction costs decreasing over time
(Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (2001)) and with market cap (Hasbrouck (2009)). It is therefore
only natural to analyze the e¤ect of transaction costs on the implications of predictability for asset
pricing models.
We analyze di¤erent portfolios based on single sorts on size, momentum, transaction costs (TC),
market-to-book (M/B), investment-to-assets (I/A) and return-on-assets (ROA) ratios, and industry
classication.3 Each sort yields ten di¤erent, equally weighted portfolios. We nd substantial cross-
sectional variation in return predictability. Across the sorts, predictability (as measured by the R2
from predictive regressions) is highest (lowest) in high (low) TC stocks, small (big) stocks, low
(high) M/B, I/A and ROA stocks, and loser (winner) stocks. Overall, predictability is strongest
in TC-sorted portfolios, lowest in size-sorted portfolios, and comparable for the other ve groups
of sorted portfolios, with R2s that are usually between 10% and 30%, consistent with previous
literature.
Our empirical analysis tests two sets of asset pricing models. We use three linear factor models:
the CAPM, the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor and the recently introduced three-factor model
of Chen, Novy-Marx and Zhang (2010). In addition, we use three consumption-based models: the
Consumption-CAPM, the Durable Consumption model of Yogo (2006) and the Ultimate Consump-
tion Risk model of Parker and Julliard (2005).
We show that in frictionless markets these asset pricing models are not consistent with the level
of predictability observed in the various sorting portfolios, which conrms Kirbys (1998) ndings
for size-based portfolios. However our subsequent analysis shows that the predictability is mainly
an anomaly that cannot be exploited due to market frictions. Incorporating frictions signicantly
improves the ability of the asset pricing models to generate levels of predictability consistent with
those observed in the market. Empirically, short sales constraints, because they imply unreasonably
high levels of alphas, cannot reconcile this predictability, but the presence of transaction costs does,
suggesting that unconstrained investors do not prot from predictability by taking short positions.
charters to sell short, while only 3% do so, and hedge funds, known for shorting, are not able to short an economically
signicant fraction of shares outstanding (Lamont and Stein (2004)).
3The testsassets are selected based on previous ndings that show individual asset returns to be cross-sectionally
predictable from the characteristics that underly our sorting and that these characteristics are distinct from one
another (e.g., Fama and French (1992); Heston, Rouwenhorst, and Wessels (1999); and Korajczyk and Sadka (2004),
among others, deal with the issue of protability of anomalous strategies).
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Transaction costs as low as 35 basis points monthly su¢ ce to reconcile the observed predictabil-
ity with the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor and the three-factor model of Chen, Novy-Marx and
Zhang (2010). Industry-based portfolios require the lowest level of transaction costs to be rec-
onciled with all asset pricing models (always less than 25 basis points monthly), and momentum
and ROA-sorted portfolios the highest level (nearly 115 basis points monthly for the CAPM and
consumption-based models). With a three-month holding period, all models can be reconciled with
predictability with less than 50 basis points transaction costs. Finally, when sorting on transaction
costs, the critical level of transaction costs needed in each decile, is always lower than the actual
transaction costs observed for that portfolio. A separate Internet appendix shows our main ndings
to be robust in an out-of-sample setting.
Our results shed light not only on time-series return predictability, but also on cross-sectional
di¤erences in return predictability. We nd strong di¤erences across portfolio sorts, predictability
being much more di¢ cult to reconcile in momentum and ROA-sorted portfolios than in industry
portfolios, and predictability being strongest in high TC-stocks, small stocks, low M/B, low I/A,
low ROA, and loser portfolios. Finally, in order for predictability to be consistent with asset pricing
models, these most predictable decile portfolios require a substantially higher level of transaction
costs than the highest decile portfolios, a result expected if the predictability observed in the market
is, indeed, rational.
2. Consistency of predictability with asset pricing models
In a standard asset pricing framework, investors maximize their expected utility (over consump-
tion), leading to the rst-order conditions
Et [mt+1Ri;t+1] = 1; (1)
where mt+1 is an admissible pricing kernel or stochastic discount factor, Ri;t+1 is the gross return
on asset i and Et[] indicates the expectation conditioned on the full set of information available
at time t. This equality states that the joint process (mt+1Ri;t+1), not returns themselves, cannot
be predicted using time-t information. We consider below the implications of Equation (1) for
predictive regressions.
2.1. Asset pricing implications for the coe¢ cients in predictive regressions
Kirby (1998) shows how asset pricing theory restricts measures of predictability from linear
regression to certain values in frictionless markets, enabling for testing its consistency. We begin
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by briey repeating his derivations.4
Consider a regression of excess returns ri;t+1 on a constant and a set of K instruments zt,
ri;t+1 = i;u0 + 
0
i;uzzt + "i;t+1: (2)
Let qt+1 be a normalized pricing kernel that has expectation one, i.e., qt+1 = mt+1=E [mt+1]. As
mt+1 itself, qt+1 assigns a price zero to excess returns, ri;t+1, and to managed excess returns, ztri;t+1,
E
240@ qt+1ri;t+1
qt+1ztri;t+1
1A35 = 0,
0@ E [ri;t+1] + Cov [qt+1; ri;t+1]
E [ztri;t+1] + Cov [qt+1; ztri;t+1]
1A = 0: (3)
Rearranging terms and pre-multiplying by E [xtx0t]
 1 ; where xt =

1 z0t
0
we get
0@ E [ri;t+1]  0z 1zz rz
 1zz rz
1A 
0@  Cov [qt+1; ri;t+1] + 0z 1zz Cov [qt+1; ri;t+1 (zt   z)]
  1zz Cov [qt+1; ri;t+1 (zt   z)]
1A = 0; (4a)
,
0@ i;u0
i;uz
1A 
0@ i;r0
i;rz
1A = 0: (4b)
Here z = E [zt], zz = V ar [zt], and rz = Cov [ri;t+1; zt]. Equation (4) denes the unrestricted
and restricted intercepts, i;u0 and i;r0, and slope coe¢ cients, i;uz and i;rz. (See Appendix A
for details of the derivations.)
If the predictability we observe in the market is consistent with the asset pricing model, then
under the assumption of frictionless markets, the coe¢ cients from predictive regressions are re-
stricted to be exactly equal to the values in the second part of Equation (4a). This means that
predictability observed in the market must be consistent with the exposure to systematic risk un-
dertaken by an investor following a trading strategy that exploits predictability (i.e., consistent
with the covariance between asset returns and the pricing kernel) and constitutes a basis for a risk
premium.
Note that we reject the asset pricing model whenever it generates levels of predictability di¤erent
from the observed predictability, whether too low or too high. These two cases are not symmetric,
however, as the trading strategy aimed at exploiting the mispricing of predictability implies taking
either short or long positions respectively. When the actual e¤ect of an instrument in the market is
stronger than the model suggests, that is, a payo¤ from a trading strategy that exploits predictabil-
ity is higher than a premium required by the actual risk exposure of such a strategy, long positions
in such strategies can take advantage of this additional premium. In the opposite situation, when
4Readers interested in details of the derivations should consult Kirby (1998).
5
the pricing model overstates the e¤ect of an instrument so that the compensation received in the
market is lower than implied by the asset pricing model, investors would like to short sell.
2.2. Incorporating frictions in the trading process
Next, we introduce short sales constraints and transaction costs into our economy.
2.2.1. Short sales constraints
He and Modest (1995) show that the presence of short sales constraints a¤ects the rst-order
conditions of the investorsportfolio problem. For excess returns, we obtain
E
240@ qt+1ri;t+1
qt+1ri;t+1zt
1A35  0; (5)
where we follow He and Modest in assuming that the vector of instruments takes only non-negative
values and has an unconditional mean equal to one, z = 
5. It is important to note that we are
using excess returns, which means that the no-short-selling constraint pertains only to risky assets.
Pre-multiplying Equation (5) with E [xtx0t]
 1 we can write Equation (4) as0@ i;u0
i;uz
1A 
0@ i;r0
i;rz
1A =
0@  1 + 0 1zz E [qt+1ri;t+1]  0 1zz E [qt+1ztri;t+1]
  1zz E [qt+1ri;t+1] +  1zz E [qt+1ztri;t+1]
1A : (6)
First, we consider a special case in which unconditional returns are assumed to be priced
correctly such that E [qt+1ri;t+1] = 0. This is an important case since our main focus lies in the
impact of market frictions on the conditional trading strategies that exploit predictability (managed
returns). This means that the e¤ect of short sales constraints applies to dynamic strategies only.
Using this assumption, the rst terms on the right-hand-site in Equation (6) become zero and the
non-positive second terms (using also that zz is positive and diagonal) then imply:
i;u0   i;r0  0; (7)
i;uz   i;rz  0:
To ensure that  1zz > 0 we orthogonalize the instruments, which results in a diagonal variance-
covariance matrix zz. Note that under this assumption the restriction on intercept is redundant
since it is equivalent to restricting the sum of the slope coe¢ cients to be non-negative, which is
satised when restricting only the slope coe¢ cients.
5Standardizing the mean to be equal to one does not a¤ect the predictive regression coe¢ cients, or R2s, but does
a¤ect the bounds of the restrictions with short sales constraints and transaction costs. The auxiliary results (available
from the authors on request) show that our results are not sensitive to this normalization.
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Incorporating short sales constraints into our analysis weakens the restrictions imposed on
regression measures of predictability. Investors prohibited from short selling assets may not be able
to equate their prots with risk premiums implied by the asset pricing models when the actual e¤ect
of some instruments is weaker in the market than the model suggests, that is,
 
i;uz  i;rz

. Thus,
an asset pricing model with short sales constraints would be rejected only in the opposite situation,
when
 
i;uz  i;rz

; meaning that investors are overcompensated for true risk exposures.
Next, we allow for mispricing also in the unconditional returns, and estimate the minimum value
of E [qt+1ri;t+1] that satises the restrictions in Equation (6). Following Chen and Knez (1996),
we interpret J = E [qt+1ri;t+1] to be an admissible performance measure. From Equation (3), we
see that it is equal to the di¤erence between the expected return on an asset and the expectation
given its risk exposure, as implied by the asset pricing model. Hence, we refer to this measure as
a generalized Jensens alpha or J . We can then determine whether short sales constraints can
reconcile predictability with rational theory by assessing whether these generalized Jensens alphas
are achievable in the market. This enables us to assess whether the required alphas are reasonable
in magnitude and high enough to cover potential transaction costs. Then we can draw a conclusion
as to whether predictability is consistent with that particular asset pricing model.
2.2.2. Transaction costs
To analyze the e¤ect of transaction costs, we follow Luttmer (1996) and di¤erentiate between the
return on a long position, Ari;t+1; and the return on a short position, Bri;t+1 with A  1  B.
He and Modest (1995) show that in the presence of transaction costs, the restrictions imposed by
a valid pricing kernel qt+1 on excess asset returns, change to0@ A
A
1A  E
240@ qt+1ri;t+1
qt+1ztri;t+1
1A35 
0@ B
B
1A ; (8)
where the second set of inequalities follow after taking unconditional expectations and using z = .
Combining it with Equation (6), we obtain the following restrictions
A   0 1zz   i;u0   i;r0  B + 0 1zz ; (9)
  1zz   i;uz   i;rz   1zz ;
where  = B   A. (See Appendix A for details of the derivations.) Note that, unlike the case of
short sales constraints, here the restriction on the intercept is binding since it is not guaranteed by
the restrictions on the slopes.
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Equation (9) shows that incorporating transaction costs in the tests for predictability weakens
the restrictions derived in frictionless markets. The di¤erence between the restricted and unre-
stricted coe¢ cients should now be within a range determined by the bid-ask spread parameter and
a normalization term that accounts for the variability of the instruments. If the instruments are
more variable, managed portfolios require more trading and taking larger positions. Hence, small
di¤erences in betas may induce large di¤erences in returns. Given the level of transaction costs, this
would imply that the di¤erence between i;uz and i;rz must be smaller, which is, indeed, reected
in the multiplication by  1zz . For the intercept, the bounds are truncated by A and B since with
no instruments i;u0   i;r0 is simply E [ri;t+1] + Cov [qt+1; ri;t+1], i.e., the mispricing or Jensens
alpha that should be between A and B. With instruments there is additional trading required
and the bounds on the intercepts become wider by a similar term as for the slope coe¢ cients.
This is normalized by the sum of the elements in  1zz , as all betas a¤ect the intercept. Finally,
with no transaction costs, the restrictions in Equation (9) collapse to the frictionless market case.
Otherwise, the higher the bid-ask spread the higher the di¤erence between the predictability in the
market and that implied by asset pricing models.
By specifying the restrictions as in Equation (9), we can test the extent to which transaction
costs can reconcile the predictability in nancial markets with asset pricing models. We do so
by deriving for the transaction costs a threshold value within the range of which the estimated
coe¢ cients will fall. If the level of such a threshold is close to the values of transaction costs
observed in the market, we can conclude that predictability is consistent with that particular
pricing model.
3. Measurement issues
Our empirical analysis considers three linear factor models and three consumption-based mod-
els known to be at least partially successful in previous work. To analyze the level of return
predictability observed in asset returns, we compare return predictability observed in the data to
values restricted by the asset pricing models using R2s and Wald tests.
3.1. Asset pricing models
Pricing kernels implied by linear factor models
In general a pricing kernel linear in factors takes the following form:
mt+1 = 1  0ft+1; (10)
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where ft+1 is the vector of factors, and  is a vector of parameters assumed to be constant.
As a starting point, we use the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and
Lintner (1965) in which the vector ft+1 contains only one factor, namely, the return on the market
portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate (MKT). We also use the four-factor model (FFC) based on
Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997), in which the vector ft+1 contains, next to the MKT
factor, three additional factor-mimicking portfolios: the small minus big portfolio (SMB), the high
minus low portfolio (HML), and the up minus down momentum portfolio (UMD).
In addition to these models, we use the three-factor model recently proposed by Chen, Novy-
Marx, and Zhang (2010) (CNMZ), which is motivated from investment-based asset pricing. In
the CNMZ-model the vector ft+1 contains the factor (MKT) and two additional investment-based
factor-mimicking portfolios: the investment factor (I/A), which is the di¤erence between the return
on low-investment stocks and the returns on high-investment stocks, and the ROA factor (ROA),
which is the return on a portfolio of stocks with high returns on assets in excess of the return
on a portfolio of stocks with low returns on assets. CNMZ show that this model outperforms the
Fama-French model in explaining anomalies in the cross-section of stock returns.
Pricing kernels implied by the consumption-based models
We start with the standard Consumption-CAPM (CCAPM) as introduced by Breeden (1979)
for example. Assuming power utility function with constant relative risk aversion , the pricing
kernel takes the following form:
mt+1 = 

Ct+1
Ct
 
; (11)
where  is the time discount factor and Ct is the consumption expenditure at time t:
Parker and Julliard (2005) propose to extend the contemporaneous measure with the subsequent
time periods to account for possible slow consumption adjustment, which gives a pricing kernel of
the form,
mSt+1 = R
f
t;t+S

Ct+S
Ct
 S
; (12)
where Rft;t+S is the risk free rate from time t to t+ S; and S represents the number of subsequent
periods in which the consumption may adjust. For large S; this model is referred to as the Ultimate
Consumption Risk model.
The above models assume the utility function to be separable across goods and time. Yogo
(2006) shows that allowing the marginal utility to be nonseparable improves the models ability
to simultaneously explain the variation in expected returns across stocks and the variation in the
equity premium over time. He considers a Durable Consumption model based on Epstein and Zin
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(1991) preferences and a nonseparable utility function in nondurable and durable consumption.
This results in the following pricing kernel:
mt+1 =
"


Ct+1
Ct
 1= v (Dt+1=Ct+1)
v (Dt=Ct)
1= 1=
R
1 1=
W;t+1
#
; (13)
where v (D=C) =
h
1 + 
h
(D=C)1 1=   1
ii1=(1 1=)
; Dt is the stock of durable goods,  = (1  ) = (1  1=) ;
 > 0 is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution,  > 0 is the relative risk aversion,  > 0 is
the elasticity of substitution between the two consumption goods, and  2 (0; 1) is the fraction of
wealth allocated to durable goods.
3.2. Di¤erence measures
We start by presenting the estimation procedure for the pricing kernels implied by linear factor
models given in Equation (10). In this case, the moment conditions are,
E [h(ri;t+1; xt; i)] = E
26666666664
ft+1 (1  ft+1)
mt+1   m
zt   z 
ri;t+1   xti;u

xt  ri;t+1 (mt+1   m)  mxti;rxt
37777777775
= 0; (14)
where ri;t+1 is the excess return on asset i, xt = [1; z0t]; zt is the (K  1) vector of forecasting
instruments. Also, i;u =

i;u0 
0
i;uz
0
and i;r =

i;r0 
0
i;rz
0
. The rst moment con-
dition identies the parameters of the factor model. The subsequent moment conditions identify
the means of the pricing kernel and the instruments. The last but one set of moment conditions
identies all unrestricted coe¢ cients in the predictive regressions. Finally, the last set of moment
conditions identies the coe¢ cients restricted by the asset pricing model.
For the consumption-based models, we estimate the additional parameters jointly on all sorted
portfolios, hence we obtain one set of parameter values for each model.6 For the CCAPM we obtain
the coe¢ cient of risk aversion  = 147. For the Ultimate Consumption Risk model we estimate
 to be 69 and allow consumption to adjust over the subsequent 33 months. For the Durable
Consumption model, we obtain the following parameter values, the coe¢ cient of risk aversion,
 = 142, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution,  = 0:020, the elasticity of substitution
between the two consumption goods,  = 1:07, and the fraction of wealth allocated to durable
6The values of parameters estimated separately on each sort do not vary considerable from the ones estimated
jointly and hence would have little inuence on our results.
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goods,  = 0:716. Our results (available from the authors on request) are robust to reasonable
changes in these parameters. Additionally, we require for this model a proxy for the return on
wealth for which we use the value weighted market index (following Yogo (2006) and Epstein and
Zin (1991)).
The system of equations in (14) is exactly identied, which means that the parameters bi;u are
exactly the same as the OLS estimates from a linear regression of excess returns on forecasting
variables. GMM estimation implies that we solve for 1=T
P
h(ri;t+1; xt;bi) = 0: Under standard
regularity conditions, the parameter bi is asymptotically distributed as
p
T (bi   ) d ! N 0;  D0i
 1i Di 1 ; (15)
where Di = E
h
@h
@i
(yi;t+1; i)
i
and 
i =
P1
j= 1E
h
hi;th
0
i;t j
i
:
3.2.1. Wald test-statistics
We use a Wald test to evaluate predictability in asset returns. Let i =

i;u i;r
0
be the
vector of unrestricted and restricted regression parameters, that is, the last 2 (K + 1) elements of
i, and i its covariance matrix. This unknown covariance matrix can be replaced with a consistent
estimator without a¤ecting the limiting distribution of the test statistic. We calculate it as the
(2 (K + 1) 2 (K + 1)) submatrix of the asymptotic covariance matrix of the GMM estimator b : 
D0i

 1
i Di
 1
; which is consistently estimated using the White covariance estimator
b
i = T 1 TX
t=1
hi;th
0
i;t: (16)
The Wald test-statistics, in frictionless markets, follow from the following minimization7
Wi = min
i
T

i   bi hbii 1 i   bi0 (17a)
subject to : i;u = i;r: (17b)
Under the null hypothesis and standard regularity conditions, Wi converges to a 2K+1 distribu-
tion, where (K + 1) is the number of forecasting instruments (including constant) and restrictions.
To address possible small sample bias, we also obtain p-values using Monte Carlo simulations.
7This follows from Wolak (1987) who showed that the Wald statistic dened as
Wi = T

Rbi hRbiR0i 1 Rbi0
where R = [IK+1; IK+1] ; and IK+1 is the (K + 1)  (K + 1) identity matrix, is also the optimal value of the
objective function dened in (17a).
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In the presence of short sales constraints the Wald test-statistcs follow from
Wi = min
i
T

i   bi hbii 1 i   bi0 (18a)
subject to :
i;u0  i;r0
i;uz  i;rz
: (18b)
Under this null hypothesis, the Wald test-statistic converges to a mixture of 2 distributions (Kodde
and Palm (1986)) and we can obtain p-values using Monte Carlo simulations.
When transaction costs are introduced the constraint for the minimization problem changes to
Wi = min
i
T

i   bi hbii 1 i   bi0 (19a)
subject to :
A   0 1zz   i;u0   i;r0  B + 0 1zz 
  1zz   i;uz   i;rz   1zz 
: (19b)
Given that these bounds are dependent, we follow the approach suggested by Wolak (1991), who
notes that from an asymptotic point of view for each i at most one of the inequalities is relevant,
so we test only this relevant restriction. Under the null hypothesis, the Wald test-statistic in the
presence of transaction costs converges to a mixture of 2 distributions,8 and we can obtain p-values
using simulations. We do account for the estimation error in bzz when estimating the above Wald
test-statistic.
3.2.2. Regression R2s
Our second measure of restrictions implied by asset pricing models is the di¤erence between the
unrestricted R2i;u and restricted R
2
i;r:
R2i;u  R2i;r =
0i;uzzzi;uz
2ri
  
0
i;rzzzi;rz
2ri
: (20)
We then proceed by calculating the admissible di¤erences in R2i;u and R
2
i;r for the various market
setups in our analysis. In the absence of market frictions, the null-hypothesis is that i;uz = i;rz;
and the admissible di¤erence between R2i;u and R
2
i;r is zero.
Let ei;z =  ei;uz ei;rz 0 be the solution to the minimization problem in (18a), which in the
case of short sales constraints leads to ei;uz  ei;rz: Hence, the resulting values of ei;uz and ei;rz
lead to an admissible di¤erence R2i;u   R2i;r that is consistent with the asset pricing model when
short selling is not allowed.
8This follows from Driessen, Melenberg, and Nijman (2005), who refer to this procedure as local hypothesis
testing, and show it to be a special case of the test proposed by Kodde and Palm (1986). As they also show, a global
interpretation would imply that we overestimated the size of transaction costs needed to avoid statistical rejection of
the model, or, equivalently, underestimated the inuence of transaction costs on model misspecication.
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Finally, with transaction costs, the solution to the minimization problem in (19a), dened as
i;z =

i;uz i;rz
0
; must fall within the transaction cost bounds. Again, the resulting values
of i;uz and i;rz lead to an admissible di¤erence R
2
i;u R2i;r that is consistent with the asset pricing
model with transaction costs.
4. Data and summary statistics
4.1. Data description
Our empirical analysis uses monthly equally weighted portfolios formed on the basis of NYSE,
Amex, and Nasdaq stocks.9 We classify the universe of stocks independently into ten size, ten
market-to-book ratio (M/B), ten momentum, ten investment-to-assets (I/A), ten return-on-assets
(ROA), ten transaction costs (TC), and ten industry portfolios.
We obtain from the Kenneth French data library the data on size, M/B, momentum, and
industry equally weighted deciles. Equally weighted I/A and ROA deciles are from Chen, Novy-
Marx, and Zhang (2010) (CNMZ). The estimates of transaction costs are from Hasbrouck (2009).10
We use returns, dividends and prices from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and
accounting information from the Compustat Annual and Quarterly Industrial Files. The sample
period is from February 1965 until December 2009. For the ten ROA deciles and the CNMZ
factors described below, the sample runs from January 1972 to June 2009, due to the availability
of accounting information.
We employ commonly used forecasting variables selected on the basis of ndings from previous
studies: a dummy for the January e¤ect (Jan); a credit risk premium (Prem) constructed as the
di¤erence in yields between Moodys Baa ranked bonds and Moodys Aaa ranked bonds; a term
structure premium (Term) constructed as the di¤erence between the 90- and 30-day Treasury bill
rate; a dividend yield on the S&P 500 index (Div); and the lagged return on the market index
(Mkt). Except for the January dummy, all of the forecasting variables are lagged one month.
To construct the pricing kernels implied by the linear factor models we obtain data on the Fama-
French-Carhart factors from the Kenneth French data library. For the consumption-based models
we use consumption, durable stock, and population data reported by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA). We measure consumption growth as the percentage change in the seasonally
9Tests run with the value-weighted portfolios lead us to similar conclusions, although we nd smaller R2s. The
results are available from the authors on request.
10We are grateful to Ken French, Long Chen, and Joel Hasbrouck for making these data available. We extend the
data of CNMZ to match our sample period for the I/A portfolios and use a shorter period from January 1972 to
June 2009 for the ROA portfolios, due to the availability of accounting information. To form transaction costs decile
portfolios each month we sort CRSP stocks based on their previous year estimate of transaction costs.
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adjusted, aggregate, real per capita consumption expenditures on nondurable goods and services.
We construct the evolution of the durable stock by iterating forward the initial real value of the
durable stock, by adding the real durable expenditure and subtracting a quarterly depreciation rate
of 6%.
For the instruments, we base our empirical analysis on the assumption that the variance-
covariance matrix of instruments zz is diagonal. To satisfy this assumption, we orthogonalize
the forecasting variables by regressing them step-wise on each other and a constant, and using the
residual terms for the instruments. We also make sure the instruments have mean one by adding
a constant.
4.2. Predictability in sorted portfolio returns
Table 1 reports in Panel A the R2s and Wald test-statistics from the OLS regression dened in
Equation (2) using all ve instruments. Panel B report analogous statistics using the bias-corrected
slopes and standard errors proposed by Amihud and Hurvich (2004).
The results in Panel A show that we are able to explain quite a large fraction of stock return
variance. We observe substantial cross-sectional variation in predictability across di¤erent sorts,
the R2s from the predictive regressions, in general, varying between 5% and 30%. Moreover,
the cross-sectional di¤erences in return predictability are consistent with cross-sectional di¤erences
in market size and transaction costs under the assumption that predictability is rational. The
portfolio of the highest transaction costs, smallest stocks, lowest market-to-book ratio portfolio
and low momentum portfolio have the highest R2s in our sample. The portfolio with the biggest
stocks and the utility industry are the least predictable. Predictability is gradually monotonically
decreasing when moving from the rst decile (P1) to the last (P10), save for the TC and I/A sorts.
For the transaction costs portfolios, as expected under rationality, predictability increases with
transaction costs. For the portfolios sorted on I/A we observe a slight U-shaped pattern.11
The portfolio with the smallest stocks is considerably more predictable than other size-deciles.
When we leave out the portfolio with highest predictability for all sorts, the R2s are lowest for the
size portfolios, roughly half the R2s for the other sort portfolios. All of the portfolios exhibit R2s
higher than 5% save for the highest size deciles and one ROA and industry portfolio.12
The Wald test-statistics always reject the null hypothesis that all coe¢ cients are zero when
we pool all portfolios within each sorting as well as when we treat each portfolio separately, save
11We also observe a slight increase in R2 for P10 in case of sorts on M/B and ROA.
12Numbers similar to those reported in this table are commonly observed in empirical studies of monthly returns
on equally weighted portfolios (e.g., Kirby (1998); Ferson and Korajczyk (1995)).
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the portfolio of the largest stocks. Also, the majority of the (unreported) slope coe¢ cients are
individually signicantly di¤erent from zero. The pattern of the Wald test-statistics resembles the
pattern of the R2s, except for momentum, where we nd little variation in the level of the Wald
test-statistics.
Panel B of Table 1 reports analogous statistics but using the Amihud and Hurvich (2004) bias-
correction. Although we observe a decrease in the Wald test-statistics when we incorporate it, the
bias correction has little inuence on the p-values and R2s. Hence, our conclusion with respect
to predictability in test assets is not altered by this small sample bias and we proceed without
bias correction in our GMM framework. Moreover, the similarity in R2s indicates that the bias is
not large, and that the di¤erences in Wald test-statistics above are driven mainly by the upward
correction to the standard errors. Incorporating this bias-correction in our further analysis would
most likely only strengthen our conclusions.
5. Empirical results
To see whether the documented predictability is consistent with an asset pricing model, we start
from a frictionless market, in which agents can trade without any costs or constraints. We then
relax this assumption by introducing rst short sales constraints and then proportional transaction
costs.
5.1. Frictionless markets
The starting point of our analysis is the restriction given in Equation (4). Table 2 presents
the results from our seven sets of portfolio sorts and six asset pricing models. Panel A of Table 2
gives the average admissible and realized di¤erences across the portfolios between the restricted
and unrestricted R2s for the various asset pricing models. Without market frictions, the admis-
sible di¤erence between unrestricted and restricted R2s should be zero under the null-hypothesis.
The results show that the realized di¤erences vary roughly between 5% and 15%. The smallest
di¤erences are observed for the size-based portfolios, and the highest di¤erences are for the M/B
and momentum-based portfolios, for all asset pricing models. Across the models, the CNMZ model
gives the smallest values for the di¤erence between unrestricted and restricted R2: Nevertheless, all
the values in Panel A are clearly far from the admissible zero value, and the di¤erences between
asset pricing models are fairly small.
Panel B of Table 2 shows the Wald tests for the di¤erences between the restricted and un-
restricted slope coe¢ cients. We can clearly reject the null hypothesis for all models and for all
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portfolio sorts. Consistent with the di¤erence between realized and admissible R2s in Panel A, the
Wald test-statistics are smallest for the CNMZ model. Across the sorts, the Wald test-statistics
are now highest for the size-based portfolios and lowest for the momentum-based portfolios. How-
ever, the size of the test-statistics is such that the null-hypothesis is rejected in all cases and the
di¤erences are not very meaningful.
To illustrate, Panels C and D show di¤erences between unrestricted and restricted regression
coe¢ cients for the top and bottom decile of each sort for one linear factor model (FFC) and one
consumption-based model (DCM).13 Most of the di¤erences are positive except for the coe¢ cients
for the term spread and the intercept. The cross-sectional pattern in the coe¢ cients shows that
the di¤erences in coe¢ cients are bigger for more predictable portfolios.
5.2. Short sales constraints
Because investors may not be able to short sell undesired assets, we allow for the possibility
that the premium on conditional strategies earned in the market is smaller than the risk premium
implied by the asset pricing model, rst assuming the unconditional returns to be priced correctly.
In this case, the asset pricing model with short sales constraints is rejected only when investors are
overcompensated for true risk exposure. The setup of Table 3 is analogous to the one presented for
the frictionless case in the previous table.
Panel A shows the average admissible di¤erence in unrestricted and restricted R2s to be fairly
small, usually about 0.50%, about 0.25% for the CNMZ model and about one percentage point for
the ultimate consumption risk model. In all cases, the realized di¤erences reported below them are
well beyond these admissible ones.
In Panel B, we nd that an inability to go short does not improve the consistency of predictability
with asset pricing models. We observe a decline in Wald test-statistics relative to the frictionless
market case but can still reject the null hypothesis for all models and all portfolio sorts at any
reasonable level of signicance. Apparently, the short positions in dynamic strategies are not
crucial for capturing the predictability observed in our sample.
Panels C and D show again the di¤erences in regression coe¢ cients, which, consistent with the
restrictions, are either zero or positive for the intercept and negative for slope coe¢ cients. We still
observe a similar cross-sectional pattern as in the frictionless market case, that di¤erences between
coe¢ cients are bigger for more predictable portfolios.
We then relax the assumption that unconditional returns are priced correctly, and allow for
13 Internet appendix reports those di¤erences for the remaining asset pricing models.
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simultaneous mispricing in both unconditional and conditional returns. Given the above results,
we now ask how much unconditional mispricing (not accessible due to short sales constraints) we
must accommodate to reconcile theory with the observed predictability. The starting point are
restrictions as given in Equation (6) in which we interpret J = E [qt+1ri;t+1] to be a generalized
Jensens alpha measure. We estimate the threshold values of this generalized alpha, which is a
minimum value needed to reconcile the asset pricing models with the predictability observed in the
portfolio sorts at the 5% signicance level. Table 4 gives the estimated alphas in basis points per
month.
Panel A shows that, in all cases, high alphas are needed, with the highest values for the CAPM
and Consumption-models. The FFC four-factor model is the only model that requires (absolute)
alphas below one percent per month for all sorts save TC-sort.14 Across the sorts, the industry
portfolios need the lowest level of alphas to be reconciled with predictability, below one percent for
all models except the CAPM. The other sorts, in particular the ones based on momentum, ROA,
and TC, require alphas as high as 4% per month.
Panels B and C show the values of the alphas needed to reconcile the most and least predictable
portfolios. The results show the predictability of the portfolio of stocks with the highest market
capitalization (Big), the highest ROA, the lowest TC, and the least predictable industry (Utilities)
to require an alpha of only 10 basis points per month for almost all models. We can thus reconcile
predictability in these portfolios for all those asset pricing models once short sales constraints
are accounted for, with a relatively small alpha. Across the other sorts, the least predictable
portfolio can be reconciled with reasonable levels of alpha (below 30 basis points) for the FFC
four-factor model and the CNMZ three-factor model save for the TC-sort. This is also so for the
Durable Consumption model, with the exception of the I/A-sort. We cannot reconcile any portfolio
predictability with asset pricing theory for the most predictable portfolio, as these portfolios require,
across all sorts except industries, and asset pricing models, (negative) alphas between 0.50% and
5.5% per month.
The estimated alphas suggest that for predictability to be consistent with the asset pricing
models in case investors face short sales constraints, unconditional risk premiums must be substan-
tially smaller than implied by the models. Given previous studies of performance evaluation we
can see that these minimum values of alphas estimated in Table 4 are above any reasonable level
in absolute terms. This means that short sales constraints are not able to reconcile predictability
14Similar values are obtained by Ferson and Harvey (1999), who nd for the Fama-French model alphas of up to
6% per year for the 25 size and market-to-book ratio portfolios, and up to 11% per year for the industry portfolios.
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save for a number of the highest decile portfolios.
5.3. Transaction costs
To determine whether payo¤s from predictability are su¢ ciently high to cover transaction costs,
we analyze whether proportional transaction costs can reconcile the predictability observed in the
data. Hence, the asset pricing models are only rejected when investorscompensation is outside the
bounds determined by the transaction costs given in Equation (9). As transaction costs increase,
these bounds increase and the restrictions on the measures of predictability weaken. Table 5
presents the results for transaction costs of 50 basis points.
In terms of di¤erences in R2s between restricted and unrestricted models in Panel A, we nd
that the realized di¤erence in R2s still exceeds the admissible di¤erences under the null hypothesis,
but they are often of a similar order of magnitude. The admissible R2s are smallest for the CNMZ
model and highest for the UCR model. The di¤erences between the realized and admissible R2s
are often only a few percentage points for all asset pricing models and never exceed 4%, except for
a few cases for the UCR model.
The Wald tests in Panel B further highlight the importance of transaction costs. With 50 basis
points transaction costs, we are able to reconcile at the 5% signicance level the FFC four-factor
and the CNMZ three-factor models for all portfolio sorts, and the Durable Consumption model
for four out of seven portfolio sorts. Furthermore, the predictability of the industry portfolios is
reconciled for all models. Except for the industry portfolios, the CAPM and UCR models are
rejected for all other portfolio sorts. Thus, the Wald test-statistics indicate that the introduction
of transaction costs can reconcile observed predictability with at least the FFC and CNMZ models.
Given that the bounds on transaction costs are symmetric around zero we observe in Panels
C and D the di¤erences between unrestricted and restricted regression coe¢ cients to have both
positive and negative signs that are consitent with frictionless markets case. We also see less
cross-sectional variation in those di¤erences in comparison to the frictionless market case.
5.3.1. Critical transaction cost levels
Given these results, the question arises how much an investor would be required to incur in
transaction costs for the documented predictability to be reconciled with the models considered
here. Table 6 shows the lowest values of transaction costs for which we cannot reject the null
hypothesis at the 5% signicance level. Given that the level of transaction costs is heavily dependent
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on trading frequency, we report the results for two holding periods: one month and three months.15
To be on the conservative side, we correct for overlapping observations when quarterly holding
periods are used by adjusting the covariance matrix of the estimated parameters by a factor three.
The rst thing we notice is that the level of transaction costs needed to reconcile predictability
with a particular model varies considerably across the models and portfolio sorts. Panel A gives
the values of the transaction costs needed to reconcile the predictability in all portfolios within
each sort. For the monthly holding period, the CAPM, CCAPM and Ultimate Consumption Risk
models require the highest transaction costs, more than 70 basis points except for the TC and
industry portfolios. Consistent with the results in the previous table, the FFC four-factor model
and CNMZ three-factor models are reconciled across all portfolio sorts for the one-month holding
horizon, with transaction costs below 35 basis points. In addition, the Durable Consumption model
can be reconciled with transaction costs below 50 basis points, for all portfolio sorts except size
and ROA sorts.
When we move to a three-month holding horizon, the thresholds decrease and we now need
45 basis points to reconcile all models except the Ultimate Consumption Risk model. Also in
particular, the performance of the consumption-based models has improved in comparison to a
one-month holding period. This is precisely the horizon at which these models were shown to be
successful in previous studies.16
Across the sorts, the industry portfolios need the lowest levels of transaction costs (up to
25 basis points at the monthly horizon), and the momentum and ROA portfolios the highest
levels of transaction costs (up to 113 basis points at the monthly level), to reconcile the observed
predictability. At the quarterly level, the di¤erences between the sorts are very small.
Panels B and C show the values of transaction costs needed to reconcile predictability in the
most and least predictable portfolios. With a one-month holding period, the least predictable
portfolio can be reconciled at a relatively low level of transaction cost - less than 30, and often less
than 10, basis points. For the size and industry portfolios, and often for momentum and ROA sorts,
the required level of transaction costs is negligible at about two basis points. With a three-month
holding period, we need at most 45 basis points for the least predictable portfolio.
15The di¤erence in results between the one-month and three-month holding periods is driven not only by the
di¤erences in trading frequency, but also by the di¤erent levels of predictability observed in quarterly as opposed to
monthly data. Unreported results (available from the authors on request) reveal for the three-month holding period a
pattern of predictability similar to the one observed for the one-month horizon returns (i.e., in terms of cross-sectional
dispersion and the signicance levels of the slope coe¢ cients), but we nd slightly higher R2s.
16For a comparison with the performance of the consumption-based asset pricing model across the data frequency
(monthly, quarterly, and yearly) see Jagannathan and Wang (2007).
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It is the most predictable portfolio which is harder for the asset pricing models to capture. Panel
A shows that with a monthly horizon, two models are able to reconcile the observed predictability
across all portfolio sorts with transaction costs below 35 basis points, but even those are not
consistent with the most predictable portfolios save for industries. Only the FFC four-factor model
is consistent with the bottom portfolio at a level of transaction costs of 55 basis points. For the
CNMZ three-factor model and Durable Consumption model, 95 basis points are needed. With a
quarterly holding period, for almost all models and sorts 85 basis points will do, except for the TC
portfolios.
Looking across the results for the one- and three-month holding periods, we see that although
both the level of predictability and threshold values of transaction costs change, we still need the
lowest transaction costs to reconcile the FFC four-factor model, CNMZ three-factor model and
Durable Consumption model with the predictability observed in the data. Moreover, the two
factor models are reconciled with as few as 35 basis points when investors rebalance their portfolio
monthly; all models are reconciled with at most 50 basis points when they trade quarterly, which
is consistent with observed levels of transaction costs in the major nancial markets.
5.3.2. Common variation in transaction costs and predictability
If transaction costs are indeed able to reconcile observed predictability with rational theory,
one would expect our di¤erence measures to vary consistently with the level of transaction costs.
The results in Table 1 already showed that we nd the strongest di¤erences in return predictability
across portfolios sorted on transaction costs, predictability being strongest in the highest transaction
costs portfolio, which is consistent with our expectations under the assumption that predictability
is rational. Likewise, from the estimated critical level of transaction costs, we nd the highest
TC-portfolio to require a higher level of transaction costs (65 basis points) to be reconciled with
rational theory than the lowest TC-portfolio (25 basis points), and these critical transaction costs
are smaller than the actual transaction costs associated with these portfolios (7.08% and 50 basis
points, respectively). Thus, predictability, inconsistent with rational asset pricing in frictionless
markets, is stronger in portfolios of stocks that have high transaction costs but can also be reconciled
within the observed levels of transaction costs.
Next to this cross-sectional evidence, Figure 1 shows the estimates of the transaction costs,
R2s from predictive regressions and frictionless market Wald test-statistics for size- and TC-sorted
portfolios estimated on a rolling window starting in January 1991.17 First, the results conrm a de-
17To conserve space we only report the results for those two sorts as they are the most relevant when linking
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creasing trend in transaction costs found in previous studies (e.g., Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan
(2001), Hasbrouck (2009)). Importantly both the R2s and all Wald test-statistics from frictionless
markets are also decreasing over time. Thus, also in the time series, the variation in transaction
costs appears to line up with variation in predictability.
In sum, both the time-series and cross-sectional evidence supports the notion that the inability
of asset pricing models to generate the observed levels of predictability in frictionless markets, can
be reconciled within the bounds of observed transaction costs.
6. Conclusions
Our main focus in this study is on the consistency of predictability with asset pricing theory
when investors face market frictions such as short sales constraints and transaction costs. Kirby
(1998) shows that in frictionless markets, prots from a trading strategy that exploits predictability
equal a risk premium implied by asset pricing models. We show that market frictions mitigate these
restrictions so that this equality need not be satised.
We nd that di¤erent portfolios, based on single sorts on size, market-to-book ratio, momentum,
investment-to-assets, return-on-assets, transaction costs, and industry classication, show substan-
tial cross-sectional variation in return predictability. Our results show that the premium earned
in the market when implementing a strategy that tracks predictability is higher than the premium
based on a true risk exposure of such strategy, conrming the ndings of Kirby (1998). However,
these premiums are not su¢ ciently high to cover transaction costs of fewer than 35 basis points in
many cases.
In particular, with transaction costs of 35 basis points, the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor
model and the three-factor model by Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2010) always generate levels
of predictability consistent with the ones observed in sorted portfolios. Industry-based portfolios
require the lowest level of transaction costs to be reconciled with asset pricing models, momentum
and ROA-sorted portfolios the highest.
Our paper uncovers an interesting area of study that we leave for future research. We nd that
similarly predictable portfolios (e.g., momentum and M/B stocks) are reconciled with di¤erent level
of market frictions. Hence, better understanding the cross-sectional nature of these portfolios will
enable us to better understand the cross-sectional di¤erences in return predictability and vice versa.
predictability to transaction costs. The results for the other sorts are available from the authors on request.
21
Appendix A. Details of the derivations
Here, we derive the restrictions given in Section 2 for the markets without frictions and with
transaction costs. We start with Equation (3) and pre-multply by E [xtx0t]
 1 to get
0 = E
240@ 1 z0t
zt ztz
0
t
1A35 1E
240@ qt+1ri;t+1
qt+1ztri;t+1
1A35 (A.1)
=
0@ 1 + 0z 1zz z  0z 1zz
  1zz z  1zz
1A0@ E [ri;t+1] + Cov [qt+1; ri;t+1]
E [ztri;t+1] + Cov [qt+1; ztri;t+1]
1A
=
0@ E [ri;t+1]  0z 1zz rz
 1zz rz
1A 
0@  Cov [qt+1; ri;t+1] + 0z 1zz Cov [qt+1; ri;t+1 (zt   z)]
  1zz Cov [qt+1; ri;t+1 (zt   z)]
1A (A.2)
which leads to restrictions in frictionless market given in Equation (4a) above.
When transaction costs are present the restrictions imposed by the asset pricing models are
given in Equation (8), which together with Equation (6) gives:0@ 1 + 0 1zz   0 1zz
  1zz   1zz
1AE
240@ qt+1ri;t+1
qt+1ztri;t+1
1A35 =
0@ i;u0
i;uz
1A 
0@ i;r0
i;rz
1A (A.3)
Note that   1zz  is a column vector with only negative elements, while all elements of  1zz are
non-negative. For the slope coe¢ cients we get:
i;uz   i;rz =   1zz E [qt+1ri;t+1] +  1zz E [qt+1ztri;t+1] : (A.4)
The minimum value of ( A.4) is therefore obtained when E [qt+1rt+1] = B and E [qt+1ztri;t+1] =
A, while the maximum is obtained when E [qt+1ri;t+1] = A and E [qt+1ztri;t+1] = B. Thus:
  1zz B +  1zz A  i;uz   i;rz    1zz A +  1zz B , (A.5)
  1zz   i;uz   i;rz   1zz :
For the intercept we get:
i;u0   i;r0 =
 
1 + 0 1zz 

E [qt+1ri;t+1]  0 1zz E [qt+1ztri;t+1] : (A.6)
Here we have that (1 + 0 1zz ) > 0, and 0 1zz is also positive. Thus, the minimum value of ( A.6)
is obtained when E [qt+1ri;t+1] = A and E [qt+1ztri;t+1] = B, while the maximum is obtained
when E [qt+1ri;t+1] = B and E [qt+1ztri;t+1] = A. Thus: 
1 + 0 1zz 

A   0 1zz B  i;u0   i;r0 
 
1 + 0 1zz 

B   0 1zz A , (A.7)
A   0 1zz   i;u0   i;r0  B + 0 1zz ;
which together with Equation ( A.5) is equal to the restrictions given in Equation (9) above.
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Table 1: Predictability ctd.
Panel A of the table presents the results of tting the following linear regression model:
ri;t+1= i0+i1Jant+1+i2 Pr emt+i3Termt+i4Divt+i5Mktt+t+1:
We report R2s and the Wald test-statistics from testing the null hypothesis that all slope coe¢ cients are
zero within one portfolio and jointly for all portfolios with p-values underneath. P1 is the lowest decile, P10
the highest decile, sorted on size, market-to-book ratio, momentum, I/A, ROA, and transaction costs. The
sample period is from February 1965 until December 2009 save for the ROA deciles for which the sample
runs from January 1972 to June 2009, due to the availibility of the accounting information.
Panel B presents the reduced-bias estimation of Amihud and Hurvich (2004) of the predictive slopes estimated
in Panel A by tting the following linear regression model:
ri;t+1= i0+i1Jant+1+i2Premt+i3Termt+i4Divt+i5Mktt+2v
c
t;Prem+3v
c
t;T erm+4v
c
t;Div+t+1:
where vct;j ; for each j = fPrem; Term;Divg ; are computed using tted values from the following rst-
order autoregressive AR(1) model:
zt;j =  + zt 1;j + vt;j ;
and using a bias-corrected estimate for bc = b+ (1 + 3b) =n+ 3 (1 + 3b) =n2: The bias-corrected standard
errors take into account estimation error in bc:
The bias-corrected slope estimates for the predictive instruments (i.e., the bc0s) are used to compute the
R2s and the Wald test-statistics analogously to Panel A.
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Table 4: The generilized Jensens alphas
Linear factor models Consumption-based models
CAPM FFC CNMZ CCAPM DCM UCR
Panel A: Jointly
Size -355 -96 -154 -342 -187 -355
M/B -285 -85 -156 -287 -194 -258
Momentum -398 -45 -96 -379 -242 -398
I/A -290 -34 -139 -287 -213 -269
ROA -398 -42 -183 -328 -384 -398
TC -379 -116 -203 -352 -413 -355
Industries -118 -29 -32 -84 -65 -96
Panel B: Most Predictable Portfolio
Small -420 -182 -273 -420 -255 -441
Low M/B -118 -161 -259 -355 -269 -355
Losers -506 -83 -312 -484 -341 -528
I/A -366 -53 -226 -355 -290 -275
ROA -528 -96 -355 -379 -342 -346
TC -468 -299 -285 -379 -364 -473
Industries -118 -52 -32 -118 -53 -139
Panel C: Least Predictable Portfolio
Big -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
High M/B -102 -22 -20 -96 -27 -89
Winners -28 -20 -13 -32 -21 -64
I/A -102 -24 -27 -96 -53 -37
ROA -10 -16 -10 -10 -15 -15
TC -10 -45 -53 -10 -10 -10
Industries -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
The table gives the minimum values of the generalized Jensens alpha in basis points for which we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the di¤erence between the unrestricted and restricted coe¢ cients falls within
a short sales constraints bound at the 5% signicance level. The results are based on joint tests for all
coe¢ cients across all portfolios (Panel A) and separately for each portfolio (Panel B for the portfolio with
the highest predictive R2 , Panel C for the portfolio with the lowest predictive R2). The sample period is
from February 1965 until December 2009. For the ten return-on-assets deciles and the CNMZ factors, the
sample runs from January 1972 to June 2009, due to the availibility of the accounting information.
29
T
ab
le
5:
T
ra
ns
ac
ti
on
co
st
s
(5
0
bp
)
L
in
ea
r
fa
ct
or
m
od
el
s
C
on
su
m
p
ti
on
-b
as
ed
m
od
el
s
L
in
ea
r
fa
ct
or
m
od
el
s
C
on
su
m
p
ti
on
-b
as
ed
m
od
el
s
C
A
P
M
F
F
C
C
N
M
Z
C
C
A
P
M
D
C
M
U
C
R
C
A
P
M
F
F
C
C
N
M
Z
C
C
A
P
M
D
C
M
U
C
R
P
an
el
A
:
R
2(
u
)-
R
2(
r)
A
d
m
is
si
b
le
u
n
d
er
th
e
nu
ll
P
an
el
B
:
W
al
d
te
st
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
S
iz
e
5.
25
%
4.
81
%
3.
04
%
4.
95
%
4.
96
%
7.
22
%
M
/B
9.
03
%
9.
61
%
7.
57
%
8.
08
%
8.
21
%
9.
96
%
S
iz
e
20
.2
0
12
.1
1
17
.0
2
32
.1
9
20
.2
0
22
.2
0
M
om
en
tu
m
9.
37
%
9.
75
%
6.
99
%
8.
86
%
8.
75
%
9.
97
%
(p
)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.1
7)
(0
.1
0)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
0)
I/
A
7.
07
%
7.
36
%
4.
69
%
6.
21
%
6.
31
%
7.
91
%
M
/B
14
.7
9
8.
63
14
.6
7
21
.8
3
15
.0
4
14
.8
4
R
O
A
6.
07
%
5.
77
%
4.
63
%
5.
18
%
5.
19
%
6.
41
%
(p
)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.1
0)
(0
.1
0)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.1
0)
(0
.0
1)
T
C
11
.2
5%
11
.8
8%
7.
80
%
7.
76
%
9.
56
%
10
.1
7%
M
om
en
tu
m
17
.7
3
9.
50
13
.5
1
27
.3
3
11
.8
8
21
.2
6
In
d
u
st
ri
es
8.
26
%
8.
56
%
4.
85
%
7.
27
%
7.
37
%
9.
29
%
(p
)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.1
2)
(0
.1
1)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
0)
R
ea
li
ze
d
I/
A
18
.9
9
12
.3
7
11
.4
3
29
.7
0
12
.4
9
20
.2
5
S
iz
e
6.
81
%
5.
88
%
4.
51
%
6.
46
%
6.
55
%
9.
46
%
(p
)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.1
0)
(0
.0
9)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
7)
(0
.0
0)
M
/B
12
.6
2%
11
.7
1%
10
.5
0%
12
.3
8%
12
.3
3%
15
.4
6%
R
O
A
15
.8
6
9.
03
12
.0
5
26
.1
2
20
.1
1
23
.5
5
M
om
en
tu
m
12
.2
9%
11
.3
5%
10
.2
1%
12
.0
6%
11
.9
9%
14
.7
8%
(p
)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.1
7)
(0
.2
8)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
0)
I/
A
10
.6
9%
9.
80
%
7.
87
%
10
.6
0%
10
.4
5%
13
.0
1%
T
C
29
.4
2
21
.9
7
23
.1
8
36
.3
9
24
.1
9
31
.3
9
R
O
A
9.
11
%
7.
93
%
6.
98
%
9.
02
%
8.
96
%
11
.1
7%
(p
)
(0
.0
6)
(0
.1
1)
(0
.1
7)
(0
.0
5)
(0
.1
2)
(0
.0
2)
T
C
11
.6
3%
10
.5
5%
9.
15
%
11
.4
8%
11
.5
5%
13
.9
7%
In
d
u
st
ri
es
10
.9
9
12
.7
0
11
.6
3
5.
52
9.
60
10
.7
1
In
d
u
st
ri
es
11
.5
3%
10
.6
4%
9.
61
%
11
.2
9%
11
.2
2%
13
.8
4%
(p
)
(0
.3
1)
(0
.5
2)
(0
.4
9)
(0
.7
4)
(0
.4
2)
(0
.2
9)
P
an
el
C
:

i;
u
 

i;
r
fo
r
F
F
C
P
an
el
D
:

i;
u
 

i;
r
fo
r
D
C
M
in
te
rc
ep
t
Ja
n
P
re
m
T
er
m
D
Y
M
kt
in
te
rc
ep
t
Ja
n
P
re
m
T
er
m
D
Y
M
kt
S
iz
e
P
1
-0
.0
74
1
0.
00
18
0.
01
84
-0
.0
56
8
0.
01
70
0.
09
57
S
iz
e
P
1
-0
.0
74
1
0.
00
18
0.
01
99
-0
.0
53
1
0.
01
39
0.
09
90
S
iz
e
P
10
-0
.0
23
2
-0
.0
00
1
0.
00
34
-0
.0
09
5
0.
00
20
0.
02
84
S
iz
e
P
10
-0
.0
22
9
0.
00
03
0.
00
87
-0
.0
09
3
0.
01
21
0.
01
53
M
/B
P
1
-0
.0
74
1
0.
00
18
0.
01
64
-0
.0
47
9
0.
01
05
0.
09
86
M
/B
P
1
-0
.0
74
1
0.
00
18
0.
02
14
-0
.0
49
8
0.
00
92
0.
10
33
M
/B
P
10
-0
.0
74
1
0.
00
18
0.
01
32
-0
.0
40
8
0.
01
73
0.
08
00
M
/B
P
10
-0
.0
74
1
0.
00
18
0.
01
72
-0
.0
39
2
0.
02
84
0.
06
73
M
om
P
1
-0
.0
74
1
0.
00
18
0.
03
95
-0
.0
94
2
0.
02
59
0.
10
02
M
om
P
1
-0
.0
74
1
0.
00
18
0.
04
06
-0
.0
92
1
0.
02
01
0.
10
55
M
om
P
10
-0
.0
74
1
0.
00
15
0.
00
24
-0
.0
17
1
0.
01
28
0.
07
82
M
om
P
10
-0
.0
74
1
0.
00
18
0.
00
95
-0
.0
13
3
0.
02
29
0.
06
62
I/
A
P
1
-0
.0
23
6
0.
00
18
0.
01
71
-0
.0
65
6
0.
00
50
0.
07
13
I/
A
P
1
-0
.0
23
6
0.
00
18
0.
02
27
-0
.0
64
1
0.
01
12
0.
06
42
I/
A
P
10
-0
.0
23
6
0.
00
18
0.
01
41
-0
.0
56
6
0.
00
81
0.
05
40
I/
A
P
10
-0
.0
23
6
0.
00
18
0.
01
81
-0
.0
59
7
0.
02
01
0.
04
53
R
O
A
P
1
-0
.0
40
3
0.
00
18
0.
02
16
-0
.0
87
4
0.
01
01
0.
09
20
R
O
A
P
1
-0
.0
40
3
0.
00
18
0.
02
31
-0
.0
78
6
0.
00
45
0.
08
98
R
O
A
P
10
-0
.0
40
3
0.
00
16
0.
00
44
-0
.0
23
5
0.
00
38
0.
06
26
R
O
A
P
10
-0
.0
40
3
0.
00
18
0.
01
32
-0
.0
22
5
0.
01
87
0.
04
28
T
C
P
1
-0
.0
57
8
-0
.0
00
2
0.
00
71
-0
.0
04
2
0.
00
69
0.
04
38
T
C
P
1
-0
.0
50
5
0.
00
04
0.
01
15
-0
.0
05
1
0.
01
16
0.
03
30
T
C
P
10
-0
.0
73
7
0.
00
18
0.
02
03
-0
.0
71
0
0.
01
09
0.
10
91
T
C
P
10
-0
.0
73
7
0.
00
18
0.
01
65
-0
.0
61
8
-0
.0
03
6
0.
12
37
S
h
op
s
-0
.0
74
1
0.
00
18
0.
01
57
-0
.0
29
9
0.
00
72
0.
07
97
S
h
op
s
-0
.0
74
1
0.
00
18
0.
02
34
-0
.0
32
4
0.
01
51
0.
07
26
U
ti
ls
-0
.0
74
1
0.
00
18
0.
00
59
-0
.0
22
6
0.
01
20
0.
07
72
U
ti
ls
-0
.0
74
1
0.
00
18
0.
01
10
-0
.0
23
2
0.
01
74
0.
07
31
T
he
ta
bl
e
pr
es
en
ts
di
¤
er
en
ce
m
ea
su
re
s
un
de
r
50
bp
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n
co
st
s
es
ti
m
at
ed
jo
in
tl
y
fo
r
di
¤
er
en
t
te
st
as
se
ts
an
d
di
¤
er
en
t
as
se
t
pr
ic
in
g
m
od
el
s.
P
an
el
A
gi
ve
s
th
e
av
er
ag
e
ad
m
is
si
bl
e
an
d
re
al
iz
ed
di
¤
er
en
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
re
st
ri
ct
ed
an
d
un
re
st
ri
ct
ed
R
2
s:
P
an
el
B
re
p
or
ts
th
e
W
al
d
te
st
s
of
th
e
di
¤
er
en
ce
s
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
un
re
st
ri
ct
ed
an
d
re
st
ri
ct
ed
re
gr
es
si
on
co
e¢
ci
en
ts
.
P
an
el
s
C
an
d
D
re
p
or
t
th
os
e
di
¤
er
en
ce
s
in
co
e¢
ci
en
ts
fo
r
th
e
to
p
an
d
b
ot
to
m
de
ci
le
of
ea
ch
so
rt
fo
r
th
e
F
F
C
an
d
D
C
M
m
od
el
s.
T
he
sa
m
pl
e
p
er
io
d
is
fr
om
Fe
br
ua
ry
19
65
un
ti
l
D
ec
em
b
er
20
09
.
Fo
r
th
e
te
n
re
tu
rn
-o
n-
as
se
ts
de
ci
le
s
an
d
th
e
C
N
M
Z
fa
ct
or
s,
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
ru
ns
fr
om
Ja
nu
ar
y
19
72
to
Ju
ne
20
09
,
du
e
to
th
e
av
ai
lib
ili
ty
of
th
e
ac
co
un
ti
ng
in
fo
rm
at
io
n.
30
T
ab
le
6:
T
hr
es
ho
ld
va
lu
es
of
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n
co
st
s
L
in
ea
r
fa
ct
or
m
od
el
s
C
on
su
m
p
ti
on
-b
as
ed
m
od
el
s
L
in
ea
r
fa
ct
or
m
od
el
s
C
on
su
m
p
ti
on
-b
as
ed
m
od
el
s
C
A
P
M
F
F
C
C
N
M
Z
C
C
A
P
M
D
C
M
U
C
R
C
A
P
M
F
F
C
C
N
M
Z
C
C
A
P
M
D
C
M
U
C
R
(R
A
=
10
)
(R
A
=
10
)
M
O
N
T
H
L
Y
Q
U
A
R
T
E
R
L
Y
P
an
el
A
:
Jo
in
tl
y
S
iz
e
94
20
21
92
68
76
33
27
25
33
29
36
M
/B
76
26
29
57
29
57
31
32
33
34
28
36
M
om
en
tu
m
11
3
29
24
94
46
76
46
31
27
33
27
36
I/
A
76
30
32
77
45
57
36
23
22
36
31
31
R
O
A
11
3
18
17
11
3
87
11
3
45
26
27
29
32
41
T
C
23
15
18
27
19
59
45
38
39
42
37
48
In
d
u
st
ri
es
25
15
15
24
6
15
36
29
34
39
31
33
P
an
el
B
:
M
os
t
P
re
d
ic
ta
b
le
P
or
tf
ol
io
S
m
al
l
11
3
52
69
94
71
99
80
73
57
80
69
76
L
ow
M
/B
83
51
74
94
64
89
78
71
62
78
66
78
L
os
er
s
13
2
55
50
11
3
64
11
3
80
73
57
83
71
76
I/
A
83
51
44
83
51
74
83
73
62
83
68
83
R
O
A
11
9
51
50
11
9
95
11
9
83
75
65
83
74
78
T
C
47
47
46
49
46
62
51
34
33
51
41
51
In
d
u
st
ri
es
9
8
8
19
8
9
36
26
24
36
24
38
P
an
el
C
:
L
ea
st
P
re
d
ic
ta
b
le
P
or
tf
ol
io
B
ig
1
1
1
4
1
5
5
4
4
5
4
4
H
ig
h
M
/B
29
16
17
27
17
31
38
29
34
38
30
29
W
in
n
er
s
7
1
1
6
1
7
33
21
24
36
26
31
I/
A
25
9
9
25
10
25
36
26
24
36
22
24
R
O
A
6
2
2
7
2
6
33
21
21
33
21
29
T
C
19
10
8
22
15
18
31
14
13
31
21
31
In
d
u
st
ri
es
1
1
1
15
1
1
1
1
1
19
1
45
T
he
ta
bl
e
gi
ve
s
th
e
va
lu
es
of
th
e
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n
co
st
s
fo
r
w
hi
ch
w
e
ca
nn
ot
re
je
ct
th
e
nu
ll
hy
p
ot
he
si
s
th
at
th
e
di
¤
er
en
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
un
re
st
ri
ct
ed
an
d
re
st
ri
ct
ed
co
e¢
ci
en
ts
fa
lls
w
it
hi
n
a
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n
co
st
s
b
ou
nd
s
at
th
e
5%
si
gn
i
ca
nc
e
le
ve
l.
T
he
re
su
lt
s
ar
e
ba
se
d
on
jo
in
t
te
st
s
fo
r
al
l
co
e¢
ci
en
ts
ac
ro
ss
al
l
p
or
tf
ol
io
s
(P
an
el
A
)
an
d
se
pa
ra
te
ly
fo
r
ea
ch
p
or
tf
ol
io
(P
an
el
B
fo
r
th
e
p
or
tf
ol
io
w
it
h
hi
gh
es
t
pr
ed
ic
ti
ve
R
2
,P
an
el
C
fo
r
th
e
p
or
tf
ol
io
w
it
h
lo
w
es
t
pr
ed
ic
ti
ve
R
2
).
T
he
le
ft
-h
an
d
si
de
of
th
e
ta
bl
e
gi
ve
s
th
e
re
su
lt
s
fo
r
a
on
e-
m
on
th
ho
ld
in
g
p
er
io
d,
th
e
ri
gh
t-
ha
nd
si
de
fo
r
a
th
re
e-
m
on
th
ho
ld
in
g
p
er
io
d.
D
ue
to
th
e
ov
er
la
pp
in
g
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
fo
r
a
qu
ar
te
rl
y
ho
ld
in
g
p
er
io
d,
w
e
co
rr
ec
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
w
it
h
th
e
sq
ua
re
ro
ot
of
th
re
e.
T
he
sa
m
pl
e
p
er
io
d
is
fr
om
Fe
br
ua
ry
19
65
un
ti
l
D
ec
em
b
er
20
09
.
Fo
r
th
e
te
n
re
tu
rn
-o
n-
as
se
ts
de
ci
le
s
an
d
th
e
C
N
M
Z
fa
ct
or
s,
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
ru
ns
fr
om
Ja
nu
ar
y
19
72
to
Ju
ne
20
09
,
du
e
to
th
e
av
ai
lib
ili
ty
of
th
e
ac
co
un
ti
ng
in
fo
rm
at
io
n.
31
Figure 1: Time-varying predictability measures.
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